This is a draft. Please contact the author to cite or for further details




старонка3/4
Дата канвертавання25.04.2016
Памер144.06 Kb.
1   2   3   4

INSERT FIGURE 6

These findings hold when it comes to health care (see the right side of Figure 6), Again, those in homogeneous groups preferred the most Democratic group in the future (4.34; p<0.01) and those in heterogeneous groups preferred a much more diverse discussion group to discuss health care (3.72; p<0.01).

Finally, Hypothesis 4 challenges the notion that partisan strength and group composition are independently sufficient for explaining the influence of partisan motivated reasoning on attitudes and preferences. Hypothesis 4 expects that weak partisans in homogeneous groups will in fact prefer a more like-minded discussion group than will strong partisans in heterogeneous groups. Figure 7 illustrates that this is indeed the case.

INSERT FIGURE 7

Weak partisans who have discussed these issues only with like-minded partisans are likely to do so again. On the left side of the graph, we see they prefer a significantly (p<0.01) more like-minded group to discuss energy policy (4.34) and health care policy (4.2; p<0.05).Strong partisans who have discussed these issues in the company of counter-partisans, on the other hand, state a preference for diversity in their future discussions regarding energy policy (3.74) and health care policy (3.90).



Summary of Results

To be sure, partisan strength exerts an important influence over the degree to which individuals engage in partisan motivated reasoning (Hypothesis 1). In addition, I find that the composition of a social setting plays a distinct and important role in this same process (Hypotheses 2 and 3). I furthermore tested the joint influence of both forces and find that social setting overwhelms partisan strength to determine how partisan motivated reasoning influences preferences (Hypothesis 3). In Table 3, I provide a summary of all of my results by hypothesis and dependent variable.



INSERT TABLE 3

My three hypotheses were subject to three distinct tests: (1) a series of preference-related questions regarding energy policy; (2) a series of preference-related questions regarding health care policy; and (3) question regarding the respondents’ ideal ideological composition of future discussion groups. Hypothesis 1 was supported in all cases, but one where it was near significant. When it came to the respondents’ perception of how effective alternative fuels are as an energy policy solution, the difference between strong and weak partisans was directionally in line with Hypothesis 1 but was not significant (p=0.17), potentially due to the fact that alternative fuels are widely popular among all participants, regardless of partisan strength. However, for the rest of the 7 dependent variables, Hypothesis 1 was strongly supported. Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 were strongly supported by all 8 dependent variables.



Conclusion and Discussion

Partisanship – arguably the most consequential determinant of our political preference and behavior – has long been studied in both observational and experimental settings as though it operates distinct from the social environment within which an individual finds himself. In reality, many of our social settings form for non-political reasons (Sinclair 2012) and lead to political discussion nonetheless (Walsh 2004). Instead of exerting an influence that is independent of social setting, the effects of partisanship are in fact highly contingent on environment.

My experimental study demonstrates that partisan strength and social setting are not independently sufficient for revealing the influence of partisan motivated reasoning over political preferences and evaluations. Their interaction, in fact, reverses several known implications that have yet to be challenged in existing research. While strong partisanship is, on its own, a reliable predictor of partisan motivated reasoning, I demonstrate that weak partisans indeed engage in more partisan motivated reasoning than do strong partisans when their social settings overshadow their partisan strength. Motivated reasoning is therefore dependent on at least one additional factor (environment) that scholars have neglected for over half a century.

As with experimental work of this nature, this study has several limitations having to do with the logistics of the execution. Most notably, the results of this study only apply to Democrats, given the skewed demographics of the population under study. Therefore, they may be differences in how a Republican sample might respond to the experimental conditions. There is no theoretical or empirical evidence to support any difference in processes of motivated reasoning between these two partisan groups, but only future work will be able to answer this question. The length of the discussion group – approximately five minutes – will surely be amended in future work, so as to determine whether longer interactions might eventually shift opinions back to where they began, or might change the results in some other way. Other questions for further research will address the over-time effects of these treatments. Similarly how would repeated exposures influence opinions? An additional question has to do with the composition of the heterogeneous groups. These groups consisted of 4 Republicans and 4 Democrats, but were otherwise relatively homogeneous in terms of sociodemographic traits. There was considerable gender diversity but minimal racial or ethnic diversity. These layers of heterogeneity may potentially influence motivated reasoning in different ways. This avenue for research is ripe for pursuit.

Our society is indeed increasingly diverse, a growing subset of the population who are more multi-racial, multi-ethnic (Pew Research 2008, 2010), and multi-linguistic (U.S. Department of Education 2011) than ever before. Modernization of communication technologies and geographic mobility draws people into larger and more increasingly diverse networks (Gonzalez and Brown 2006) and Americans are now more likely than ever before to multiple social and political groups. As networks get larger, they do become more diverse. For these reasons, the study of preference formation is stifled as long as it is conducted in isolated settings. The experimental study that I present in this paper is a pioneering attempt to uncover the consequences of social settings – both homogeneous and heterogeneous in nature – on our political attitudes and behaviors. These outcomes simply cannot be effectively understood so long as we only conduct our studies in contexts of isolation, for the political world takes place in the company of others. This study provides an important illustration of why that matters for the way we think about politics.

Appendix A
Strong Partisanship Prime:
These days, Democrats and Republicans in Washington represent very different policy platforms. Regardless of whether you prefer the Democrats or the Republicans, please take a few minutes to think about why you choose to prefer that party, as opposed to the other party. In the space below, please write 3 or 4 things you especially like about the political party that you like best.

[text entry box]


Now please take another few minutes to consider your biggest criticisms against the opposing political party. What do you dislike about the other party? In the space below, please write 3 or 4 things you especially dislike about the party you do not prefer.

[text entry box]


Weak Partisanship Prime:

These days, many Americans are fed up with partisan bickering and are frustrated with both political parties – including their own. Many Americans express a desire for more cooperation in politics and have complaints about even their preferred political party. Regardless of whether you tend to prefer the Democrats or the Republicans, what frustrates you about your preferred party? In the space below, please write 3 or 4 of your biggest criticisms or complaints against your preferred political party.


[text entry box]

Appendix B
Full Text of Energy Policy Information:
Many Americans are concerned with our country’s dependence on foreign oil and our rising gas prices. Republicans and Democrats have offered distinct approaches to improving energy policy. While these policies are not entirely at odds with each other, the government will likely prioritize one policy over the other.
The Republican approach makes it easier for companies to receive permits to drill for oil off the coast of the US (most significantly oil-rich Alaska). The argument is that easing the application process for drilling will increase oil production. It will remove the nearly endless regulations that oil producers must overcome, many of which have no apparent positive role -- it is widely agreed that these excessive regulations do not protect the environment. Easing restrictions would expand US energy supply, create American jobs, and help to lower gas prices.
The Democratic approach encourages the use of domestically produced alternative fuels (for example, wind and solar power) and increases incentives for designing more efficient vehicles and buildings. The argument is that many savings would come from accelerating electric vehicle adoption and tightening fuel efficiency standards. Government would provide assistance to companies working to improve the efficiency and gas mileage of gas-powered cars and trucks. Emphasizing alternative energies would reduce our demand for oil and generate new jobs in renewable energy development.
Full Text of Health Care Policy Information:
Many Americans are concerned with the rising costs of health care and limited access to health insurance. Republicans and Democrats have offered distinct approaches to lowering these costs and improving care. While these policies are not entirely at odds with each other, the government will likely prioritize one policy over the other.

The Republican approach seeks to increase access to healthcare and to reduce costs by increasing competition among insurance providers. This plan proposes to give Americans a tax credit they can use to purchase their preferred plan from a provider they have selected in the market. In addition, this plan would allow individuals to purchase coverage across state lines. This would increase competition among health insurance providers, thus lowering costs.

The Democratic approach seeks to increase access to healthcare and reduce costs by giving government a greater role in the provision of coverage. This plan requires large businesses to provide healthcare to their employees, or else to pay a tax that would go into a government fund. Individuals without coverage from their employer would be allowed to receive coverage from the government. This plan would allow the government to subsidize health insurance, thus lowering the cost for the individual.

References
Bartels, Larry M. 2002. "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political

Perceptions." Political Behavior 24(2):117-150.


Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee. 1954. Voting.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bramoulle, Y., and B. Rogers. 2010. “Diversity and Popularity in Social Network.” Working Paper. Northwestern University and Universite Laval, Mimeo.
Bullock, John G. 2011. “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate.” American Political Science Review 105 (August): 496-515.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960.

The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons.


Caruso, Eugene M., Nicole L. Mead, and Emily Balcetis. 2009. Political partisanship

influences perception of biracial candidates’ skin tone. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 20168-20173.


Druckman, James. N. 2001. The implications of framing effects for citizen competence. Political Behavior 23: 225–256.
Druckman, James N. 2004. “Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects.” American Political Science Review 98: 671-686.
Druckman, James N. N.d. “The Politics of Motivation.” Critical Review, Forthcoming.
Druckman, James N., and Toby Bolsen. 2001. “Framing, Motivated Reasoning, and Opinions about Emergent Technologies.” Journal of Communication 61: 659-688.
Druckman, James N. and Cindy D. Kam. 2011. “Students as Experimental Participants: A Defense of the ‘Narrow Data Base’.” In Handbook of Experimental Political Science, eds. James N. Druckman, Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 41-57.
Druckman, James N., and Kjersten Nelson. 2003. “Framing and deliberation: How citizens' conversations limit elite influence.” American Journal of Political Science 47:729-45.
Druckman, James N., and Lilach Nir. 2008. “Campaign Mixed-Message Flows and Timing of Vote Decision.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 20: 326-346.
Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. N.d. “How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation.” American Political Science Review, Forthcoming.
Festinger, Leon. 1957. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press.


Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. “Social Pressure

And Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment.” American



Political Science Review 102: 33-48.
Gerber, Alan S., and Gregory A. Huber. 2010. “Partisanship, Political Control, and

Economic Assessments.” American Journal of Political Science 54: 153-173.


González, R., and Brown, R. 2006. “Dual identities and intergroup contact: Group status

and size moderate the generalization of positive attitude change.” Journal of



Experimental Social Psychology 42: 753-767.
Granovettcr, Mark S. 1973. “The strength of weak ties.” American Journal of

Sociology 78: 1360-1380.
Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2002. “Reclaiming the Experimental Tradition in Political Science.” In Helen V. Milner and Ira Katznelson, eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline, 3rd Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., pp. 805-32.
Green, Donald Philip and Bradley Palmquist. 1994. “How Stable is Party Identification?”

Political Behavior 16:437–466.
Groenendyk, Eric. 2012. “Under Pressure: The Polarizing Effect of Expected Partisan

Interaction.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science

Association. Chicago, IL.
Huckfeldt, R., P. E. Johnson, and J. Sprague. 2004. Political disagreement: The survival of diverse opinions within communication networks. New York: Cambridge.
Huckfeldt, R., and J. Sprague. 1987. "Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political

Information." American Political Science Review December: 1197-1216.


Huckfeldt, R., and J. Sprague. 2002. “Individuals, Dyads, and Networks: Autoregressive Patterns of Political Influence.” Prepared for delivery at A Conference on the Social Context of Politics, Brown University, June 2, 2002.
Isenberg, Daniel J. 1986. “Group Polarization.” Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology 50:1141–51.
Jacoby, William G. 1988. “The Impact of Party Identification on Issue Attitudes.” American Journal of Political Science 32: 643-661.
Kruglanski, A. W., and D. M. Webster. 1996. Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and "freezing." Psychological Review 103(2): 263-283.
Kunda, Ziva. 1990. “The case for motivated reasoning.” Psychological Bulletin 108: 480-49.
Lascher, Edward L. and John L. Korey. 2011. “The Myth of the Independent Voter, California Style.” California Journal of Politics and Policy 3 (January).
Lavine, Howard, Christopher Johnston, and Marco Steenbergen. 2012. The Ambivalent Partisan. Oxford University Press.
Levendusky, Matthew S. 2010. “Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters.” Political Behavior 32 (1): 111-31.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg.

2008. The American Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.


Lodge, Milton, and Charles Taber. 2000. “Three Steps toward a Theory of Motivated Political Reasoning.” In Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin (eds.), Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Magleby, David B., Candice J. Nelson, and Mark C. Westlye. 2011. “The Myth of the Independent Voter Revisited.” in Paul Sniderman and Benjamin Highton (Eds.) Facing the Challenge of Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public Opinion and Political Participation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Martinez, Michael D., Stephen C. Craig, and James G. Kane 2005. “Pros and Cons:

Ambivalence and Public Opinion.” In Ambivalence and the Structure of Public Opinion (Eds. Stephen C. Craig and Michael Martinez). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.


Mendelberg, Tali. 2002. The deliberative citizen: theory and evidence. In Research in

Micropolitics: Political Decisionmaking, Deliberation and Participation, MX Delli Carpini, L Huddy, R Shapiro (Eds.), 6:151–93. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Mutz, Diana C. 2002. “The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political

Participation.” American Journal of Political Science 46:838–55.
Mutz, Diana C. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory

Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nicholson, Stephen P. 2011. “Dominating Cues and the Limits of Elite Influence.” Journal of Politics 73 (October): 1165-177.
Nicholson, Stephen P. 2012. “Polarizing Cues.” American Journal of Political Science 56 (January): 52-66.
Nir, L. 2005. “Ambivalent social networks and their consequences for participation.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 17: 422-442.
Pew Forum on Religious and Public Life. 2008. Available at: http://religions.pewforum.org/
Pew Forum on Religious and Public life. 2010. Available at:

http://religions.pewforum.org/


Popielarz, Pamela A., and J. Miller McPherson. 1995. "On the Edge or In Between:

Niche Position, Niche Overlap and the Duration of Voluntary Association

Memberships." American Journal of Sociology 101(3):698-720.
Price, Vincent, Joseph N. Cappella., and Lilach Nir. 2002. “Argument repertoire as a

reliable and valid measure of opinion quality: Electronic dialogue during campaign 2000.” Political Communication 19: 73-93.


Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. “The role of partisan stereotypes in information processing about political candidates.” American Journal of Political Science, 37: 472–496.
Redlawsk, David. 2002. “Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration: Testing the Effects of

Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making.” Journal of Politics 64: 1021-1044.


Redlawsk, David. 2004. “What Voters Do: Information Search During Election Campaigns.” Political Psychology 25: 595-610.
Scheufele, Dietram A., Matthew C. Nisbet, Dominique Brossard, and Erik C. Nisbet. 2004. “Social Structure and Citizenship: Examining the Impacts of Social Setting, Network Heterogeneity, and Informational Variables on Political Participation.” Political Communication 21(3): 315-38.
Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. The Social Citizen. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge. 2006. “Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of

Political Beliefs.” American Journal of Political Science, 50: 755-769.

Tetlock, Philip E. 1983.  “Accountability and perseverance of first impressions.”  Social

Psychology Quarterly, 46, 285 292.
Tetlock, Philip E., and J. Kim. 1987.  Accountability and judgment in a personality

prediction task.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition, 52, 700 709


Tilley, James, and Sara B. Hobolt. 2011. “Is the Government to Blame? An Experimental

Test of How Partisanship Shapes Perceptions of Performance and Responsibility.”



The Journal of Politics 73: 316-330.
U.S. Department Institute of Education Statistics. 2011. The Condition of Education 2011

(NCES 2011-033), Indicator 6.


Visser, Penny,George Bizer, and Jon Krosnick. 2006. “Exploring the latent structure of

strength-related attitude attributes.” In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental



Social Psychology, 38, (pp. 1-67). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Walsh, Katherine Cramer. 2004. Talking about Politics: Informal Groups and Social

Identity in American Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Weimann, G. (1982). On the importance of marginality: One more step into the two-step

flow of communication. American Sociological Review, 47, 764–773.


TABLES





Table 2. Dependent Variables

Question

Response scale

When it comes to energy policy, how do you think the government should prioritize its efforts?

1=Only prioritize drilling for oil

2=Mostly prioritize drilling for oil

3=Slightly prioritize drilling for oil

4=Equally prioritize drilling for oil and expanding alternative fuels

5= Slightly prioritize alternative fuels

6=Mostly priority alternative fuels

7=Only prioritize alternative fuels


How effective is drilling for oil as an energy policy solution?

1=Extremely ineffective

2=Mostly ineffective

3=Slightly ineffective

4=Neither ineffective nor effective

5=Slightly effective

6=Mostly effective

7=Extremely effective


How effective is investing in alternative fuels as an energy policy solution?

1=Extremely ineffective

2=Mostly ineffective

3=Slightly ineffective

4=Neither ineffective nor effective

5=Slightly effective

6=Mostly effective

7=Extremely effective


In the future, if you were to discuss energy policy a group, what kind of group would you prefer?

1=A group of all Republicans

2=A group of mostly Republicans

3=A group of slightly more Republicans

4=An equal mix of Republicans and Democrats

5=A group of slightly more Democrats

6=A group of mostly Democrats

7=A group of all Democrats


When it comes to health care policy, how do you think the government should prioritize its efforts?

1=Only increase competition among insurers

2=Mostly increase competition among insurers

3=Slightly increase competition among insurers

4=Equally increase competition among insurers and expand government subsidies to cover costs

5= Slightly expand government subsidies to cover costs

6=Mostly expand government subsidies to cover costs

7=Only expand government subsidies to cover costs


How effective is increasing competition among insurers a health care policy solution?

1=Extremely ineffective

2=Mostly ineffective

3=Slightly ineffective

4=Neither ineffective nor effective

5=Slightly effective

6=Mostly effective

7=Extremely effective


How effective is investing expanding government subsidies to cover costs as a health care policy solution?

1=Extremely ineffective

2=Mostly ineffective

3=Slightly ineffective

4=Neither ineffective nor effective

5=Slightly effective

6=Mostly effective

7=Extremely effective


In the future, if you were to discuss energy policy a group, what kind of group would you prefer?

1=A group of all Republicans

2=A group of mostly Republicans

3=A group of slightly more Republicans

4=An equal mix of Republicans and Democrats

5=A group of slightly more Democrats

6=A group of mostly Democrats

7=A group of all Democrats

1   2   3   4


База данных защищена авторским правом ©shkola.of.by 2016
звярнуцца да адміністрацыі

    Галоўная старонка