The Balance of Power and nato expansion




Дата канвертавання24.04.2016
Памер60.06 Kb.
The Balance of Power and NATO Expansion *
Kenneth N. Waltz
Working Paper 5.66

October 1998


University of California, Berkeley

Center for German and European Studies

Abstract
The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained

by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests. The current balance of power leaves an absence of external restraints on the

United States and allows it to expand NATO. The states of the European Union generally have shown no enthusiasm for expanding NATO

eastward, but their fate continues to depend on decisions made in America. NATO expansion is simply a means of maintaining and lengthening

America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of European States.
NATO, Institutions, and Balances of Power1
The purpose of this paper is both to ask how well non-realist approaches to international politics serve us and to show how realist theory helps

one to understand international-political events and changes. One of the charges hurled at realist theory is that it fails to explain the failure of a new

balance of power to form since the end of the Cold War. Another charge is that the survival and flourishing of NATO defeats realists’

expectations.


With the demise of the Soviet Union, the international-political system became unipolar. In the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the

least durable of international configurations. This is so for two main reasons. One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their

own borders, thus weakening themselves in the long run. Ted Robert Gurr after examining 336 polities reaches the same conclusion that Robert

G. Wesson had reached earlier: “Imperial decay is... primarily a result of the misuse of power which follows inevitably from its concentration.2

The other reason for the short duration of unipolarity is that even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance,

weaker states will worry about its future behavior. America’s founding fathers warned against the perils of power in the absence of checks and

balances. Is unbalanced power less of a danger in international than in national politics? Throughout the Cold War, what the United States and the

Soviet Union did, and how they interacted, were dominant factors in international politics. The two countries, however, constrained each other.

Now the United States is alone in the world. As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power. Faced by

unbalanced power, some states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into

balance. The reactions of other states to the drive for dominance of Charles I of Spain, of Louis XIV and Napoleon I of France, of Wilhelm II

and Adolph Hitler of Germany, illustrate the point.


Will the preponderant power of the United States elicit similar reactions? Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others.

The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, justice, and well-being in the world. These

terms, however, are defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others. In international politics,

overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it. With benign intent, the United States has behaved, and until its power is

brought into balance, will continue to behave in ways that sometimes frighten others.
For almost half a century, the constancy of the Soviet threat produced a constancy of American policy. Other countries could rely on the United

States for protection because protecting them seemed to serve our security interests. Even so, beginning in the 1 950s West European countries

and, beginning in the 1970s, Japan had increasing doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear deterrent. As Soviet strength increased,

West European countries began to wonder whether America could be counted on to use its deterrent on their behalf, thus risking its own cities.

When President Carter moved to reduce American troops in Korea, and later when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and strengthened its

forces in the Far East, Japan developed similar worries.


With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer faces a major threat to its security. As General Colin Powell said, when

he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of enemies. I’m down to Castro and Kim Ii Sung.”3

Constancy of threat produces constancy of policy; absence of threat permits policy to become capricious. When few if any vital interests are

endangered, a country’s policy becomes sporadic and self willed.


The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign-policy choices. A dominant power

acts internationally only when the spirit moves it. One example is enough to show this. When Yugoslavia’s collapse was followed by genocidal

war in successor states, the United States failed to respond until Senator Robert Dole moved to make Bosnia’s peril an issue in the forthcoming

presidential election; and it acted not for the sake of its own security but to maintain its leadership position in Europe. American policy was

generated not by external security interests but by internal political pressure and national ambition.
Aside from specific threats it may pose, unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy and gives them reason to strengthen their

positions. The United States has a long history of intervening in weak states, often with the intention of bringing democracy to them. American

behavior over the past century in Central America provides little evidence of self restraint in the absence of countervailing power. Contemplating

our history and measuring our capabilities, other countries may well wish for ways to fend off our benign ministrations. Concentrated power

invites distrust because it is so easily misused. To understand why some states want to bring power into a semblance of balance is easy, but with

power so sharply skewed, what country of group of countries has the material capability and the political will to bring the “unipolar moment” to an

end?
The expectation that following victory in a great war a new balance of power will form is firmly grounded in both history and theory. The last four

grand coalitions (two against Napoleon and one in each of the World Wars of the twentieth century) collapsed once victory was achieved.

Victories in major wars leave the balance of power badly skewed. The winning side emerges as a dominant coalition. The international

equilibrium is broken; theory leads one to expect its restoration.


Clearly something has changed. Some believe that America is so nice that, despite the dangers of unbalanced power, others do not feel the fear

that would spur them to action. Michael Mastanduno, among others, believes this to be so, although he ends his essay with the thought that

“eventually power will check power. ”4 Others believe that the leaders of states have learned that playing the game of power politics is costly and

unnecessary. I shall say more about that in my next essay, but in fact the explanation for sluggish balancing is a simple one. In the aftermath of

earlier great wars, the materials for constructing a new balance were readily at hand. Previous wars left a sufficient number of great powers

standing to permit a new balance to be rather easily constructed. Theory enables one to say that a new balance of power will form but not to say

how long it will take. International conditions determine that.
Those who refer to the unipolar moment are right. In our perspective, the new balance is emerging slowly; in historical perspectives, it will come

in the blink of a eye.


I ended a 1993 article this way: “one may hope that America’s internal preoccupations will produce not an isolationist policy, which has become

impossible, but a forbearance that will give other countries at long last the chance to deal with their own problems and make their own mistakes.

But I would not bet on it.”5 I should think that few would do so now. Charles Kegley has said, sensibly, that if the world becomes multipolar

once again, realists will be vindicated.6 Seldom do signs of vindication appear so promptly.


The candidates for becoming the next great powers, and thus restoring a balance, are the European Union, China and Japan.
The countries of the European Union have been remarkably successful in integrating their national economies. The achievement of a large measure

of economic integration without a corresponding political unity is an accomplishment without historical precedent. On questions of foreign and

military policy, however, the European Union can act only with the consent of its members, making bold or risky action impossible. The European

Union has all the tools—population, resources, technology, and military capabilities—but lacks the organizational ability and the collective will to

use them. As Jacques Delors said when he was President of the European Communism: “It will be for the European Council, consisting of heads

of state and government..., to agree on the essential interests they share and which they will agree to defend and promote together.”7 Policies that

must be arrived at by consensus can be carried out only when they are fairly inconsequential. Inaction as Yugoslavia sank into chaos and war

signaled that Europe will not act to stop wars even among near neighbors. Western Europe was unable to make its own foreign and military

policies when its was an organization of six or nine states living in fear of the Soviet Union. With less pressure and more members, it can hardly

hope to do so now. Only when the United States decides on a policy are European countries able to follow it. As far ahead as the eye can see,

Western Europe will remain an international-political cipher.
The fate of European states continues to depend on decisions made in America. NATO’s expansionist policy illustrates how the absence of

external restraints on the United States affects its policy. The states of the European Union generally have shown no enthusiasm for expanding

NATO eastward and have revealed little willingness to bear a share of the costs entailed. Germany, for obvious reasons, is the only West

European country to show enthusiasm. In a statement that would be hard to credit were it not made by an European Union official, Hans van der

Broek, commissioner for external relations with countries from Central Europe to Russia, has said that the Union takes no position on NATO’s

expansionist policy because it has no “competence” on NATO enlargement.8


In the old multipolar world, the core of an alliance consisted of a small number of states of comparable capability. Their contributions to one

another’s security were of crucial importance because they were of similar size. Because major allies were closely interdependent, the defection

of one would have made its partners vulnerable to a competing alliance. The members of opposing alliances before World War I were tightly knit

because of their mutual dependence. In the new bipolar world, the word “alliance” took on a different meaning. One country, the United States or

the Soviet Union, provided most of the security for its bloc. The defection of France from NATO and of Chin a from the WTO (Warsaw Treaty

Organization) failed even to tilt the central balance. Early in the Cold War, Americans spoke with alarm about the threat of monolithic communism

arising from the combined strength of the Soviet Union and China, yet the bloc’s disintegration caused scarcely a ripple. American officials did not

proclaim that with China’s defection America’s defense budget could safely be reduced by 20 or 10 percent or even be reduced at all. Similarly,

when France withdrew from NATO, American officials did not proclaim that defense spending had to be increased for that reason. Properly

speaking, NATO and the WTO were more treaties of guarantee than military alliances old style.9 The end of the Cold War quickly changed the

behavior of allied countries. In early July of 1990, NATO announced that the alliance would “elaborate new force plans consistent with the

revolutionary changes in Europe.” 10 By the end of July, without waiting for any such plans, the major European members of NATO unilaterally

announced large reductions in their force levels. Even the pretense of continuing to act as an alliance in setting military policy disappeared.
I expected NATO to dwindle at the Cold War’s end and ultimately to disappear as the four previous grand coalitions had done once their

principal adversaries were defeated.11 To some extent, the expectation has already been borne out. NATO is no longer even a treaty of

guarantee since one cannot answer the question, guarantee against whom?
Glenn Snyder has remarked that “alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response.” 12 How then can one

explain NATO’s survival and growth? An obvious part of the explanation is found in what has long been known about organizations in general.

Organizations, especially big ones with strong traditions, have long lives. The March of Dimes is an example sometimes cited. Having won the

war against polio, its mission was accomplished. Nevertheless, it cast about for a new malady to cure or contain. Even though the most appealing

ones—cancer, heart, lungs, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis—were already taken, it did find a worthy cause to pursue, the amelioration of birth

defects. One can fairly claim that the March of Dimes enjoys continuity as an organization, pursuing an end consonant with its original purpose.

How can one make such a claim for NATO?
The question of purpose may, however, not be a very important one. As someone has said, we need not worry about what an organization’s task

is to be. Create an organization and it will find something to do. Once created, and the more so once it has become well established, an

organization becomes hard to get rid of A big organization is managed by large numbers of bureaucrats who develop a strong interest in its

perpetuation. According to Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, NATO headquarters was recently manned by 2640 officials, most of whom

presumably want to keep their jobs.13 Twenty-five years ago, Bernard Brodie wondered whether NATO’s useful life was over. Its founding

fathers thought of it as a defensive alliance needed until Europe’s recovery would enable it to provide its own defense. That time had surely come.

Yet, as Brodie remarked, “the inertias built into” NATO’s international bureaucracy “can only be imagined by those who have not experienced

them.” He concluded by saying “we are either blessed or burdened with this creation of a time that was very different from our days.” 14 Clearly,

Brodie thought that by 1973 the burden outweighed the blessing, and the burden continues to be borne disproportionately by the United States.
A second part of the explanation of NATO’s longevity is more important than the first part. Liberal institutionalists take NATO’s seeming vigor

as confirmation of the importance of international institutions and as evidence of their resilience. Realists, noticing that as an alliance NATO has

lost its major function, see it simply as a means of maintaining and lengthening America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of European

states. The survival and expansion of NATO tell us much about American power and influence and little about institutions as multilateral entities.

The ability of the United States to extend the life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and maintained

by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests.


The Bush administration saw, and the Clinton administration continues to see, NATO as the instrument for maintaining America’s domination of

the foreign and military policies of European states. In 1991, Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew’s letter to the governments of

European members of NATO warned against Europe’s formulating independent positions on defense. France and Germany had thought that a

European security and defense identity might be developed within the EU and that the Western European Union, formed in 1954, could be

revived as the instrument for its realization. The Bush administration quickly squelched these ideas. The day after the signing of the Maastricht

Treaty in December of 1991, President Bush could say with satisfaction that “we are pleased that our Allies in the Western European Union...

decided to strengthen that institution as both NATO’s European pillar and the defense component of the European Union.15
The European pillar was to be contained within NATO, and its policies were to be made in Washington. Weaker states have trouble fashioning

institutions to serve their own ends in their own ways, especially in the security realm. Think of the defeat of the European Defense Community in

1954 and the inability of the Western European Union in the more than four decades of its existence to find a significant role independent of the

United States. Realism reveals what liberal institutionalist “theory” obscures: namely, that international institutions serve primarily national rather

than international interests.16 Keohane and Martin, replying to Mearsheimer’s criticism of liberal institutionalism, ask how we are “to account for

the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions if such institutions are lacking in significance.”17 If the

answer were not already obvious, the expansion of NATO would answer it: to serve what powerful states believe to be their interests.
Domestic politics supply a third part of the explanation for America’s championing NATO’s expansion. With the administration’s Bosnian policy

in trouble, Clinton needed to show himself an effective foreign-policy leader. With the national heroes, Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel clamoring

for their countries’ inclusion, foreclosing NATO membership would have handed another issue to the Republican Party in the Congressional

elections of 1994. To tout NATO’s eastward march, President Clinton gave major speeches in Cleveland and Detroit, cities with significant

numbers of East European voters.18 Votes and dollars are the life blood of American politics. New members of NATO will be required to

improve their military infrastructure and to buy modern weapons. The American arms industry, expecting to capture its usual large share of a new

market, has lobbied heavily in favor of NATO’s expansion.19
The reasons for expanding NATO are weak, most of them the product not of America’s foreign-policy interests but of its domestic political

impulses The reasons for opposing expansion are strong. 20 It draws new lines of division in Europe, alienates those left out, and can find no

logical stopping place west of Russia. It weakens those Russians most inclined toward liberal democracy and a market economy. It strengthens

Russians of opposite inclination. It reduces hope for further major reductions of nuclear weaponry. It pushes Russia toward China instead of

drawing Russia toward Europe and America. Late in 1996, expecting a measure of indifference, I asked an official in the Indian Ministry of

External Affairs whether India was concerned over our expansive NATO policy. He immediately replied that a policy seemingly designed to bring

Russia and China together of course was of great concern to India. Despite much talk about the “globalization” of international politics, American

political leaders to a dismaying extent think of East or West rather than of their interaction. With a history of conflict along a 2600 mile border,

with ethnic minorities sprawling across it, with a mineral-rich and sparsely-populated Siberia facing China’s teeming millions, Russia and China

will find it difficult to cooperate effectively, but we are doing our best to help them do so. Indeed, the United States provides the key to

Russian-Chinese relations over the past half century. Feeling American antagonism and fearing American power, China drew close to Russia after

the war and remained so until the United States seemed less, and the Soviet Union more, of a threat to China. The relatively harmonious relations

the United States and China enjoyed during the 1970s began to turn sour in the late 1980s when Russian power visibly declined and American

hegemony became imminent. To alienate Russia by expanding NATO, and to alienate China by pressing it to change its policies and lecturing its

leaders on how to rule their country, are policies that only an overwhelmingly powerful country could afford to, and only a foolish one be

tempted, to follow.


Once some countries are brought in, how can others be kept out? Secretary Albright has said that no democratic country will be excluded from

NATO because of its position on the map. A hurt and humiliated Russia can expect to suffer further pain. Secretary Albright thinks it ridiculous of

Russia to fear NATO’s inclusion of a distant Hungary, but the distance of additional members of the alliance and Russia will be shorter.21

Anyway it is not new members that Russia fears; it is America’s might being placed ever closer to its borders. Any country finds it difficult to

understand how another country feels. Americans should, however, be able to imagine what their fears would be if they had lost the Cold War

and Russia expanded the WTO into the Americas, all the while claiming that it was acting for the sake of stability in central America with no threat

to the United States implied. Adept statesmen keep their countries’ potential adversaries divided. The American administration seems to delight in

bringing them together.


Even while American leaders were assuring Russia that NATO’s expansion was not motivated by animosity toward Russia, American and

NATO estimates of the costs entailed depended in large measure on speculations about when Russia would once again pose a military threat to

Europe.22 As Boris Yeltsin said in Moscow, with President Jiang Zemin at his side: “Someone is longing for a single-polar world.”23 Pressure

from the west helps to unite them in opposition to this condition. Both parties now speak of a “constructive partnership aimed at strategic

cooperation in the twenty-first century.”24 The American rhetoric of globalization turns out to be globaloney: We fail to understand how our

policy for one region affects another.


Winners of wars, facing few impediments to the exercise of their wills, have often acted in ways that created future enemies. Thus Germany, by

taking Alsace and most of Lorraine from France in 1871, earned its lasting enmity; and the Allies’ harsh treatment of Germany after World War I

produced a similar effect. In contrast, Bismarck persuaded the Kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna after the great victory at

Königgrätz in 1866. In the Treaty of Prague, Prussia took no Austrian territory. Thus Austria, having become Austria-Hungary, was available as

an alliance partner for Germany in 1879. Rather than learning from history, the United States is repeating past errors by extending its influence

over what used to be the province of the vanquished.25


Can I find anything to be optimistic about the pointless policy of expansion? Perhaps this: In a coordinate organization, more is less. The larger the

number of members, the greater the number of interests to be served and the more varied the views that have to be accommodated. Just as a

wider EU means a shallower one, so a more inclusive NATO means a less coherent and focused alliance. West Europeans think of NATO’s

expansion as being of low cost because with no foe to fear additional military expenditure would have little purpose. Thus Jacques Church has in

effect said not a centime for NATO’s expansion, and British leaders have said not a penny. Yet American leaders continue to claim that old and

new members will pay the major share of the costs. NATO argued enough about burden sharing during the Cold War, and America by and large

lost because it believed that fairly or not it had to do what Europe’s and its own security required. A larger NATO will have more to argue about

and, lacking the disciplining threat of a serious opponent, the arguments are likely to become more frequent and bitterer than they used to be.


One can turn this the other way and say that differences will be muted precisely because the absence of a threat means it matters little whether

they are resolved. The members of NATO, however, will still have the obligation to come to one another’s defense. The American military at

least will take the obligation seriously, as they should. Moreover, nuclear deterrence will not cover new and peripheral members of the alliance.

Yet the Clinton administration proposes to expand NATO to unspecified limits, and the Senate will probably acquiesce. Deterrence is cheaper

than defense. Increasing American commitments makes reliance on deterrence more desirable and less possible.
Although I find it hard to be optimistic about the results of expansion, we have some grounds for hoping that it will weaken NATO and even lead

to its demise. Using the example of NATO to reflect on both the relevance of realism and the poverty of liberal institutionalism leads to some

important conclusions. The error of realist predictions that the end of the Cold War would mean the end of NATO arose not from a failure of

realist theory to comprehend international politics, but from an underestimation of what in my view is America’s folly.


The effects that international institutions may have on national decisions are but one step removed from the capabilities and intentions of the major

state or states that gave them birth and sustain them. The Bretton Woods system strongly affected individual states and the conduct of

international affairs. But when the United States found that the system no longer served its interests, the Nixon shocks of 1971 were administered.

International institutions are created by the more powerful states, and the institutions survive as long as they serve the major interests of their

creators, or are thought to do so. “The nature of institutional arrangements,” as Stephen Krasner put it, “is better explained by the distribution of

national power capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure” 26 —or, I would add, by anything else.


Either International conventions, treaties, and institutions remain close to the underlying distribution of national capabilities or they court failure.27

Citing examples from the past 350 years, Krasner found that in all of the instances “it was the value of strong states that dictated rules that were

applied in a discriminating fashion only to the weak.28 The sovereignty of nations, a universally recognized international institution, hardly stands in

the way of a strong nation that decides to intervene in a weak one. Thus, according to a senior official, the Reagan administration “debated

whether we had the right to dictate the form of another country’s government. The bottom line was yes, that some rights are more fundamental

than the right of nations to nonintervention....We don’t have the right to subvert a democracy but we do have the right against an undemocratic

one.”29
Most international law is obeyed most of the time, but strong states bend or break laws when they choose to. Keohane and Martin believe that

realism insists “that institutions have only marginal effects.30 On the contrary, realists have noticed that whether institutions have strong or weak

effects depends on what states intend. Strong states use institutions, as they interpret laws, in ways that suit them. Thus, Susan Strange, in

pondering the state’s retreat, observes that “international organization is above all a tool of national government, an instrument for the pursuit of

national interest by other means.”31
Interestingly, Keohane and Martin, in their effort to refute Mearsheimer’s trenchant criticism, in effect agree with him. Having claimed that his

realism is “not well specified,” they note that “institutional theory conceptualizes institutions both as independent and dependent variables.” 32

Dependent on what?—on “the realities of power and interest.” Institutions, it turns out, “make a significant difference in conjunction with power

realities.”33 Yes! Liberal institutionalism, as Mearsheimer says, “is no longer a clear alternative to realism, but has, in fact, been swallowed up by

it.”34 Indeed, it never was an alternative to realism. Institutionalist theory, as Keohane has stressed, has as its core structural realism, which

Keohane and Nye sought “to broaden.”35 The institutional approach starts with structural theory, applies it to the origins and operations of

institutions, and unsurprisingly ends with realist conclusions.
Alliances illustrate the limitations of institutionalism with special clarity. Keohane has remarked that “alliances are institutions, and both their

durability and strength may depend in part on their institutional characteristics.”36 In part, I suppose, but one must wonder on how large a part.

The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were quite durable. They lasted not because of alliance institutions, there hardly being any, but because

the core members of each alliance looked outward and saw a pressing threat to their security. Previous alliances did not lack institutions because

states had failed to figure out how to construct bureaucracies. Previous alliances lacked institutions because in the absence of a hegemonic leader,

balancing continued within as well as across alliances.37 NATO lasted as a military alliance as long as the Soviet Union appeared to be a direct

threat to its members. It survives and expands now not because of its institutions but because the United States wants it to. Moreover, as a

high-level European diplomat put it, “it is not acceptable that the lead nation be European. A European power broker is a hegemonic power. We

can agree on U.S. leadership, but not on one of our own.”38 Accepting the leadership of a hegemonic power prevents a balance of power from

emerging in Europe, and better the hegemonic power should be at a distance than next door.


Balancing among states is not inevitable. As in Europe, a hegemonic power may suppress it. Whether or not balancing takes place also depends

on the decisions of governments. Stephanie Neumann’s book, International Relations Theory and the Third World, abounds in example of

states that failed to mind their own security interests through internal efforts or external arrangements, and, as one would expect, suffered invasion,

loss of autonomy, and dismemberment.39 Keohane believes that “avoiding military conflict in Europe after the Cold War depends greatly on

whether the next decade is characterized by a continuous pattern of institutionalized cooperation.40 If one accepts the conclusion, the question

that needs to be answered is what sustains the “pattern of institutionalized cooperation”?

Endnotes
*: The Debate Over NATO Enlargement; Conference Papers March 9-10, 1998; University of California, Berkeley Back.
Note 1: I am indebted to Robert Rauchhaus for help on this paper from its conception to its completion. Back.
Note 2: Quoted by Ted Robert Gurr, “Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971,” American Political Science Review 68,4

(December 1974), p.1504. Cf. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to

2000 (New York: Random House, 1987). Back.
Note 3: “Cover Story: Communism’s Collapse Poses a Challenge to America’s Military,” US. News and World Report 3,16 (October 14,

1991), p.28. Back.


Note 4: Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” 21 (Spring

1977), p 488. And see Josef Joeffe’s interesting analysis of America’s role, “‘Britain’ or ‘Bismarck’? Toward an American Grand Strategy after

Bipolarity,” International Security 19 (Spring 1995). Back.
Note 5: Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” p.79. Back.
Note 6: Charles W. Kegley, Jr. “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities,”

International Studies Quarterly 37 (June, 1993), p.149. Back.


Note 7: Jacques Delors, “European Integration and Security,” Survival 33 (March / April 1991), p.106. Back.
Note 8: Europe: Magazine of the European Union, June 1997, p.16 Back.
Note 9: See Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power,”Journal of International Affairs

21(1967), p.219. Back.


Note 10: John Roper, “Shaping Strategy without the Threat;” Adephi Paper no.257 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, Winter

1990/91) pp.80-81 Back.


Note 11: Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (Fall 1993), 75-76. Back.
Note 12: Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.192. Back.
Note 13: Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” Security Studies 3

(Autumn 1993), p.20. Back.


Note 14: Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp.338-39. Back.
Note 15: Mark S. Sheetz, “Correspondence,” International Security 22 (winter 1997/98), p.170; Mike Winnerstig, “Rethinking Alliance

Dynamics,” paper given at the International Studies Association annual meeting, March 18-22, 1997, p.23. Back.


Note 16: Cf. Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Back.
Note 17: Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” International Security 20 (Summer 1995), p.40. Back.
Note 18: James M. Goldgeier, “NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision,” Washington Quarterly 21 (Winter 1998), pp.94-95. Back.
Note 19: William D. Hartung, “Welfare for Weapons Dealers 1998: The Ridden Costs of NATO Expansion,” (New York: New School for

Social Research, World Policy Institute, March 1998). Jeff Gerth and Tim Weiner, “Arms Makers See Bonanza in selling NATO Expansion,”

New York Times, June 29, 1997, p.1, 8. Back.
Note 20: See Michael Brown, “The Flawed Logic of Expansion,” Survival 37,1 (Spring 1995), pp.34-52. Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn

of Peace in Europe (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996). Phillip Zelikow, “The Masque of Institutions,” Survival 38, 1 (Spring

1996). Back.
Note 21: Madeleine K. Albright, “Stop Worrying about Russia,” New York Times, April 29, 1998. Back.
Note 22: Steven Erlanger, “A War of Numbers Emerges Over Cost of Enlarging NATO,” New York Times, October 13, 1997, p. Al. Back.
Note 23: Michael R. Gordon, “Russia-China Theme: Contain the West,” New York Times, April 24, 1997, p. A3. Back.
Note 24: Yeltsin in China to Put an End to Border Issue,” New York Times, November 10, 1997, p. A8. Back.
Note 25: Tellingly, John Lewis Gaddis comments that he has never known a time when there was less support among historians for an

announced policy. “History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement,” Survival, 40 (Spring 1998), p.147. Back.


Note 26: Stephen Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (April, 1993), p.234.

Back.
Note 27: Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict The Third World Against Global Liberalism, (Berkeley: University of California), p.263 and

passim. Back.
Note 28: “International Political Economy: Abiding Discord,” Review of lnternational Political Economy 1 (Spring 1994), p.16. Back.
Note 29: Quoted by Robert Tucker, Intervention and the Reagan Doctrine (New York: Council on Religious and International Affairs,

1985), p.5. Back.


Note 30: Robert 0. Keohane and List M. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” International Security, 20 (Summer 1995), pp.42, 46.

Back.
Note 31: Strange, Retreat of the State, p. xiv; and see pp.192-193. Back.


Note 32: Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” p.46. Back.
Note 33: Ibid., p.42. Back.
Note 34: Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” p.85. Back.
Note 35: Keohane and Nye, p.251; cf. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics,” in Keohane, ed., Neo Realism and Its Critics (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1986), p.193, where he describes his approaches as a “modified structural research program.” Back.


Note 36: Keohane, 1989, p.15 Back.
Note 37: Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp. Back.
Note 38: Quoted by Robert J. Art, “Why Westem Europe Needs the United States and NATO,” Political Science Quarterly, 11 (Spring

1996), p.36. Back.


Note 39: Stephanie Neumann, ed., International Relations Theory and the Third World, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). Back.
Note 40: Robert 0. Keohane, “The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and State Strategies,” in Helga Haftendorn and

Christian Tuschoff, eds., America and Europe in the an Era of Change (Boulder: Westview, 1993), p.53. Back.


База данных защищена авторским правом ©shkola.of.by 2016
звярнуцца да адміністрацыі

    Галоўная старонка