A. First, A substantial reduction is 25% - military regulations prove.
Major Steven N. Tomanelli et al, has served as a Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force, Chief of Acquisition and Fiscal Law for the Air Force s Air Mobility Command, and Senior DoD Counsel for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Army Lawyer, February 1994, Lexis Academic
1. Regulatory Changes--Notification Requirements for Termination or Reduction of Defense Programs.--The DOD has issued an interim rule requiring military departments and defense agencies to notify contractors of a potential termination of, or substantial reduction in, a defense program. n581 Under the new rule, each military department and defense agency must establish procedures for determining which defense programs are likely to be terminated or substantially reduced as a result of the submission of the President's budget or enactment of an appropriations act. Within thirty days of such submission or enactment, agencies and military departments must notify affected contractors of the proposed termination or reduction. Affected contractors are those with a contract of $ 500,000 or more under a program identified as likely to be terminated or reduced by at least twenty-five percent. Within two weeks after receiving notice from the government, contractors must notify, among others, their affected employees and subcontractors of the proposed termination or reduction.
Second, Presence is the totality of military activities in each country.
Barry M. Blechman et al, President of DFI International, Spring, 1997, Strategic Review, p.14
Given its multifaceted nature, neither practitioners nor scholars have yet settled on a single definition of presence. Technically, the term refers to both a military posture and a military objective. This study uses the term “presence” to refer to a continuum of military activities, from a variety of interactions during peacetime to crisis response involving both forces on the scene and those based in the United States. Our definition follows that articulated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: “Presence is the totality of U.S. instruments of power deployed overseas (both permanently and temporarily) along with the requisite infrastructure and sustainment capabilities."
B. Futenma houses less than four percent of troops in Japan
BBC News, 1-25-10, [“Japan 'May Rethink' US Futenma Air Base After Poll”, http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/01/25-5]
Japan signed a deal with the US four years ago that was part of a broader realignment of American troops. A key part of the plan was to relocate the Futenma air base, home to about 2,000 Marines, to the smaller city of Nago. Okinawa is home to most of the 47,000 American troops based in Japan.
C. voting issue-
Limits – we can’t prepare for the infinite number of cases they justify. Holding the Line on 25% is necessary to Prevent the Aff From Removing One Type of Weapon or One Birgade from ANY Of the Topic Countries
Text: The United States federal government should inform the government of Japan that the United States federal government will not close Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and withdraw 8000 U.S. Marines from Japan if and only if the government of Japan does not allow the United States federal government to establish an air station on Shimoji Island.
Contention one: it competes—it’s less than the plan and is net beneficial.
Contention two: Taiwan
1. Conflict over Taiwan is inevitable now—expanded U.S. base presence near Taiwan is key to prevent war.
Robert Maginnis, a Retired Army lieutenant colonel, a national security and foreign affairs analyst for radio and television and a senior strategist with the U.S. Army, 8/6/10 [Winning the New Cold War, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=38425
Chinese General Ma Xiaotian, the deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army, protested that exercise, claiming it threatened Beijing, China’s capital. The Chinese responded to the perceived threat with naval exercises in the South China Sea, hundreds of miles to the south. The Chinese used those exercises to reiterate its territorial claims to the South China Sea as “indisputable sovereignty” and warned the issue should not be “internationalized.” Then for the first time Beijing elevated its sovereignty claim to the level of a “core” national interest—a category previously reserved for Tibet and Taiwan. China’s “internationalized” comment was a reaction to a statement made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She told the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) that “the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” Control of that sea was supposedly settled by an ASEAN declaration in 1992 which Beijing signed. But that agreement was quickly violated by the Chinese and now that Beijing is a superpower it is demanding sovereign control of the sea through which passes half of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage and hosts rich fishing and oil reserves. The problem for the U.S. and its Asian allies is Beijing won’t stop demanding more territory. It will extend its territorial waters from the usual 12 miles to include its entire exclusive economic zone which extends 200 miles from its coastline. That impacts Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and South China Sea rim countries like Vietnam. Apparently the intent to expand its sovereign sphere of influence was prompted by China’s new heady superpower status which influenced ordinary Chinese who anticipated the new Cold War. Earlier this year China’s state-run newspaper the Global Times announced more than half of Chinese people agree that “a Cold War will break out between the U.S. and China.” A Cold War, according to the Pentagon, is the state of tension wherein political, economic, military, and other measures short of overt armed conflict are employed to achieve national objectives. China’s national objectives—regime survival, a robust economy, and political control of its sphere of influence—have created tension with the U.S. Consider some of those Cold War-producing tensions: • America’s decision to sell weapons to democratic Taiwan raised political tensions. The U.S. earlier this year announced its decision to sell $6.4 billion worth of weapons to the island nation, a territory China claims as part of the mainland. “This time China must punish the U.S.,” said Major-General Yang Yi, a Chinese naval officer, in response to the weapons sale. • China’s support for rogue regimes raised tensions. Robert Einhorn, the U.S. State Department’s adviser on nuclear non-proliferation, testified that China is a major obstacle to the success of U.S. sanctions against Iran by taking up the slack left by countries that have dropped business and trade ties with Iran in adherence to the sanctions. • China is creating tensions by helping North Korea. Not only is China giving North Korea political cover regarding the recent military exercises, but last week a Chinese delegation was in Pyongyang to sign an economic and technological agreement. That agreement indicates Beijing will continue its defiance of U.S. attempts to reproach the wayward North Koreans. • There are significant economic tensions. China holds $2.5 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves—mostly U.S. debt. Some Chinese like Luo Yuan with China’s Academy of Military Sciences recommends using that debt to leverage American cooperation on fractious issues like arms sales to Taiwan. Recently China became the world’s second-largest economy and could surpass America by 2025. That success is attributable to Beijing’s guiding principle for all policies—do whatever grows its gross domestic product (GDP). The 17-year estimates for GDP per capita annualized growth is 12.13% for China, according to the United Nations. • China’s economic guiding principle explains growing tension over competition for limited raw materials and the regime’s decision to keep its currency under- valued. Beijing keeps its currency, the Yuan, cheap to give its exporters a competitive edge which undercuts American exporters. Beijing aggressively pursues raw materials using every state means available. That explains why it has monopolized material markets like rare earth metals, which are used for high-tech devices such as lasers and iPhones. The Wall Street Journal reported last week that China “already consumes one-third of the world’s copper and 40% of its base metals, and produces half of the world’s steel.” • China’s rapidly growing military is creating superpower tensions. The Pentagon’s annual report on China’s military indicates the regime has been on a top-to-bottom transformation campaign for more than 20 years, fueled by annual double-digit budget increases. Today Beijing fields a 3.35 million man force that is armed with sophisticated anti-access capabilities for targeting American aircraft carriers; a submarine fleet that rivals America’s in number and stealth; and an increased ability to project forces abroad. Chinese Rear Admiral Zhang Huachen earlier this year said, “With our naval strategy changing now, we are going from coastal defense to far sea defense.” That view explains China’s use of the military to enforce its territorial claims and conduct high-seas bullying such as harassing merchant ships and U.S. warships much as the Soviets did in the first Cold War. China’s militarization surge threatens U.S. long-term interests in Asia especially given that Beijing, according to that country’s 2006 Defense White Paper, intentionally plans to use military force to advance its economic interests. Washington and Beijing should mitigate these tensions but until that happens America needs a plan to win the Cold War which must include three elements. First, the U.S. must increase its military presence in Asia by establishing numerous bases that assure our allies and contain Beijing’s expanding military. China is poised to expand its military presence throughout the region and will likely employ an asymmetric capability to advance its hegemonic ambitions.
2. A Shift to Shimoji is Necessary to Deter a China Invasion of Taiwan
Chris Rahman, Research Fellow @ The Center for Maritime Policy – PhD in History & Politics @ Univ. of Wollongong, 01 [Defending Taiwan and Why It Matters, https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/press/Naval%20War%20College%20Review/2001/Article%20by%20Rahman%20Autumn%202001.pdf]
Taiwan suffers from small size, lack of strategic depth, and proximity to the threat; Japan labors under constitutional and psychological constraints. Accord- ingly, responsibility for safeguarding Taiwan and the region’s sea-lanes falls in- evitably upon the shoulders of the United States. The administration seems increasingly aware of this; President Bush has declared that America “would do everything it took to help Taiwan defend itself.”81 The forthrightness of Bush’s statement may well have reduced the diluting effects of strategic ambiguity upon deterrence. Nevertheless, the ability of the United States to deter or defend against mainland aggression ought not be taken for granted; it is clear neither what would deter the Beijing leadership if it felt its own domestic control was at stake, nor whether U.S. naval forces are prepared to operate against a geo- graphically advantaged enemy with forces and doctrine increasingly designed to repulse them.82 Much of the literature on China’s strategic challenge reflects an assumption that deterrence by the conventional military superiority of U.S. forces is easy.83 More perceptive analyses of both the theory and the (American) “practice” of deterrence suggest that Cold War deterrence experience is not necessarily appli- cable to new “regional” adversaries.84 If it is not, the ability of the United States to deter threats to far-flung regional friends and allies becomes tenuous; “The real problem for deterrence arises when the deterrent effect needs to be extended from a distant protecting power.”85 To be effective, deterrence policy needs to be tailored to “the given opponent and context.” An urgent need exists, then, for improved understanding and intelligence about regional rivals. Any deterrence policy “tailored” for the Taiwan Strait will need to take ac- count of the ways in which China might combine “asymmetric” strategies with more conventional measures.87 Asymmetries—in geography, interests, capabili- ties, and doctrine—further complicate the operation of deterrence over long distances. The Pentagon now recognizes that such factors must be accounted for when assessing correlations of forces between such pairs of “dissimilar actors” as China-Taiwan and China–United States.88 “The root of effective tactical action,” advises Wayne Hughes, “is an appreciation that force estimation is a two-sided business and that not all elements of force are found in the orders of battle.”89 An effective amphibious invasion of Taiwan seems beyond China at present;90 at the same time, the U.S. ability to counter a concerted attempt at military coer- cion is less than certain.91 From a purely operational perspective there is cause to question the American predominance at sea. A Taiwan conflict is less likely to be fought in the open ocean, where the U.S. Navy possesses its greatest operational advantages, than in the strait itself, China’s coastal zone, and the East China and northern South China Seas. The problems facing maritime powers in an un- friendly and confined littoral environment are both severe and well known.92 American and Taiwanese forces would be faced with an unfavourable geo- graphic position—the defence of a small island only a hundred nautical miles away from a hostile continental power in possession of a long coastline and sig- nificant strategic depth, including active defence far out to sea. U.S. naval forces at sea would have to sustain themselves from a small number of bases in the Northeast Asian theater, vulnerable to political unreliability among host na- tions and to ballistic missile attack.93 Furthermore, China’s land-based airpower, missiles, and surveillance assets would contest any response from the sea. The problems will be exacerbated if the United States attempts to defend Taiwan un- der restrictive rules of engagement. A recent RAND report has identified ways to enhance the American force posture in Asia and, for a Taiwan contingency specifically, to overcome some of these concerns: development of Guam as a power-projection hub (from which to fly B-52s armed with Harpoon antiship cruise missiles for long-range con- ventional strikes); new concepts for joint operations by carrier aviation and Air Force combat support elements; new bases in the southern Ryukyus (only 150–250 nautical miles from Taipei) and, possibly, on northern Luzon and Batan Island (between Luzon and Taiwan).94 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Re- view also reflects such considerations, stating in less specific terms that the United States will: maintain U.S. bases in Northeast Asia and improve Air Force “contingency basing”; increase the presence of aircraft carrier battle groups and numbers of surface warships and submarines based in the western Pacific; and conduct Marine Corps littoral warfare training in the region.95 A former Ameri- can defence and naval attaché to China has clearly stated that by these measures the Bush administration “is attempting to deter any possible Chinese adventure against Taiwan.”9
3. Cross-strait war escalates to global nuclear War
Straits Times, 2k. [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.
4. Japan will say yes to the CP But Spurn Their Perms—they’ll ok a U.S. base on Shimoji If We Condition on Closure
Patrick Goodenough, staff writer, 10-14-2004. [CNS News, US Reportedly Eyes Island Near Taiwan As Military Base, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1245158/posts]
Three years after a Rand defense policy study recommended it, reports in Asian media suggest that the U.S. wants to move some U.S. Marine Corps assets from the Japanese island of Okinawa to a tiny island less than 250 nautical miles from Taiwan. The Japanese island of Shimoji-shima boasts a 10,000-foot runway, built decades ago for civilian airline flight training. It is long enough for combat-armed F-15C fighter planes to use safely. The island's location would bring U.S. aircraft considerably closer in the event of a future conflict between China and Taiwan. While there has been no confirmation of any plans, Japan's NHK broadcaster said on its website Thursday that the U.S. had proposed to temporarily move the Marine Air Station based at Futenma on Okinawa to Shimoji. The presence of the base - and other U.S. military bases - on Okinawa long has been controversial, and Tokyo has been pressing for the number of troops there to be reduced substantially as part of the U.S. global reevaluation of force posture. U.S. and Japanese officials have been discussing changes to the deployment of the 47,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, half of whom are based on Okinawa. At an Asia-Europe leaders' meeting in Hanoi last week, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said some U.S. troops on Okinawa could be relocated to bases outside of Japan, and some could be moved elsewhere within Japan. Koizumi and President Bush discussed the planned realignment of troops during a meeting in New York last month. Tensions on Okinawa rose again last August when a Futenma-based U.S. Marine Sea Stallion helicopter crashed onto a nearby university campus. No-one was hurt, but the accident sparked new protests. The U.S. agreed in 1996 to move the Futenma base within five to seven years, but alternatives have been hard to come by. One proposal has been to build an artificial offshore base about 40 miles away from the current location, but that has also drawn local protests. NHK said the government was reserving judgment on the Shimoji proposal, with some officials worried that it would spark local opposition on the small island while others considered it "a feasible idea." A Taiwanese online news site, ET Today, reported Wednesday that Japan and the U.S. had recently discussed the possibility of turning the island into a "cooperative security outpost." The report said Tokyo had already decided to station Japanese F-15C fighter jet units on the island, which is just four square miles in area. "The U.S. has shown interest in the strategic position of the island and the move is clearly directed at China," ET Today said. Japan's Kyodo news agency last month cited unnamed sources as saying the U.S. had asked Japan to open the civilian runway at Shimoji for joint drills involving U.S. and Japanese planes. Quid pro quo Although moving the Marines base to Shimoji would reduce tensions on Okinawa, some Japanese are likely to be equally unhappy about the move. Earlier this year, when Marine helicopters used Shimoji as a refueling stop on their way to and from military exercises in the Philippines, local government officials complained and small groups of protestors demonstrated near the runway. The local government's military affairs office director, Choki Kuba, was quoted as citing a government promise in 1971 that Shimoji airport would not be used for military purposes. The Marine Corps said at the time that refueling was "an operational necessity," given the helicopters' range. In 2001, the Rand Corporation published a report for the Pentagon on U.S. force posture strategy in Asia, which said that basing U.S. fighters on Shimoji "would be of great help were the U.S. military called on to support Taiwan in a conflict with mainland China." It acknowledged that "this may be politically problematic in Japan," noting that the local government wanted to promote Shimoji and the other islands in the southern Ryukyu group as "ecologically-friendly vacation destinations." The Rand study said one way of overcoming likely resistance would be to offer a quid pro quo. "The removal or reduction of U.S. forces elsewhere in the islands, such as the withdrawal of the Marines from Okinawa, could be the currency with which Washington might pay for a foothold in the critical area surrounding the troubled waters of the Taiwan Strait."
1. The aff’s discourse of imminent danger is a façade constructed to conceal the thruth – security is a theology of fear serving only to stabilize sovereign identity
Øyvind Jæger, @ Norweigian Institute of International Affairs and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2k [Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “Securitizing Russia: Discoursive Practice of the Baltic States,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=18]
Moreover, viewing security as a speech act not only makes it possible to include different sectors in a study of security, and thus open up the concept. It also clears the way for resolving security concerns by desecuritising issues which through securitisation have raised the concern in the first place. Knowing the logic of securitisation and pinning it down when it is at work carries the possibility of reversing the process by advocating other modalities for dealing with a given issue unluckily cast as a matter of security. What is perceived as a threat and therefore invoking defence, triggering the spiral, might be perceived of otherwise, namely as a matter of political discord to be resolved by means of ordinary political conduct, (i.e. not by rallying in defence of sovereignty). A call for more security will not eliminate threats and dangers. It is a call for more insecurity as it will reproduce threats and perpetuate a security problem. As Wæver (1994: 8)16 puts it: "Transcending a security problem, politicizing a problem can therefore not happen through thematization in terms of security, only away from it." That is what de-securitisation is about. David Campbell (1992) has taken the discursive approach to security one step further. He demonstrates that security is pretty much the business of (state) identity. His argument is developed from the claim that foreign policy is a discourse of danger that came to replace Christianity’s evangelism of fear in the wake of the Westphalian peace. But the effects of a "evangelism of fear" and a discourse of danger are similar – namely to produce a certitude of identity by depicting difference as otherness. As the Peace of Westphalia signified the replacement of church by state, faith by reason, religion by science, intuition by experience and tradition by modernity, the religious identity of salvation by othering evil ("think continually about death in order to avoid sin, because sin plus death will land you in hell"17 – so better beware of Jews, heretics, witches and temptations of the flesh) was replaced by a hidden ambiguity of the state. Since modernity’s privileging of reason erased the possibility of grounding social organisation in faith, it had to be propped up by reason and the sovereign state as a anthropomorphic representation of sovereign Man was offered as a resolution. But state identity cannot easily be produced by reason alone. The problem was, however, that once the "death of God" had been proclaimed, the link between the world, "man" and certitude had been broken (Campbell 1992: 53). Thus ambiguity prevailed in the modernist imperative that every presumption grounded in faith be revealed by reason, and on the other hand, that the privileging of modernity, the state, and reason itself is not possible without an element of faith. In Campbell’s (1992: 54) words: In this context of incipient ambiguity brought upon by an insistence that can no longer be grounded, securing identity in the form of the state requires an emphasis on the unfinished and endangered nature of the world. In other words, discourses of "danger" are central to the discourses of the "state" and the discourses of "man". In place of the spiritual certitude that provided the vertical intensity to support the horizontal extenciveness of Christendom, the state requires discourses of "danger" to provide a new theology of truth about who and what "we" are by highlighting who and what "we" are not, and what "we" have to fear. The mode through which the Campbellian discourse of danger is employed in foreign (and security) policy, can then be seen as practices of Wæverian securitisation. Securitisation is the mode of discourse and the discourse is a "discourse of danger" identifying and naming threats, thereby delineating Self from Other and thus making it clear what it is "we" are protecting, (i.e. what is "us", what is our identity and therefore – as representation – what is state identity). This is done by pointing out danger, threats and enemies, internal and external alike, and – by linking the two (Campbell 1992: 239): For the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of danger (such as Foreign Policy) with threats identified and located on the "outside".
2. The end result is total war and genocide – representations of extraordinary risk ensure astonishing violence
Karsten Friis, UN Sector @ the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2k [Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2]
The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.
3. The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s logic of security – only through rejection can we allow actual political thought
Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 08 [Critique of Security, 185-6]
The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'
1. No internal link to Japan alliance
Their Feffer Evidence is ALL FROM Before Kan and Obama Agreed to Relocate the Base to Camp Schwag – It Only Says Futenma is Contentious, Not that it Tanks The Alliance –
The Card Link Turns the Aff – It says Removing Futenma Would be Infectious, Promoting Opposition to the all Basing
Their Marine Times evidence has NO WARRANTS – it just cites that locals like to refer to Futenma as the most controversial and dangerous base
2. Futenma is Having ZERO Effect On the Alliance- Opinion Polls and Recent Co-operation Prove
Jeffrey Bader, Senior fellow at Brookings- Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, 6/7/10 [Keynote Speech: US-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized Partnership” http://stimson.org/japan/pdf/Transcript_Jeff_Bader.pdf]
As you know, we reached agreement in late May. In essence, the plan keeps our original objective of relocating Futenma to a less populated area in Okinawa, namely Camp Schwab, and lays the groundwork for the projected move of 8,000 Marines to Guam. It will allow us to return most U.S. military facilities in Okinawa south of Kadena Air Force Base, but it made adjustments to the plan, at the request of the Japanese, in particular transferring some training off of Okinawa, possibly to Tokunoshima Island, to further lighten the impact on Okinawans, studying U.S.-Japan shared use of bases, discussing a “green approach” to the bases. Some steps included a precise location of the runway at Camp Schwab and its method of construction will be decided by the end of August. The President has always believed that U.S.-Japan relations are much more important than a single base issue. We did not want relations to be over-shadowed by this matter, but we couldn’t ignore it. It came to be seen as an indicator of how the Japanese government viewed the security relationship and its own national security. So, this agreement is important, not only in its own right, but in terms of what it reflects about political change in Japan. First of all, it shows that the old model of gaiatsu, that is, “The Americans made me do it,” is finished. We welcome its demise, in part because that is simply not the way that President Obama does business. In its place, the DPJ leadership introduced a very messy and very public rethinking of Japan’s security interests and the meaning of the U.S.- Japan alliance. The outcome of their review of the options on Futenma is significant, because Japan’s leadership reached their own conclusions through an inclusive and painfully transparent process. This was not a handful of Japanese national security experts making a back room deal and then “selling it” as something Japan was obligated to do for Washington. The agreement reflects Japanese public mainstream views about its own best interests. This outcome reflects, in my view, a maturation of the DPJ’s understanding of the stakes and national security implications of the alliance. Within hours of the vote to make him Prime Minister, Mr. Kan held a news conference in which he made clear his intent to implement the Futenma Agreement. The sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, by North Korea served as a dramatic reminder that Northeast Asia is still “a dangerous neighborhood.” The Japanese Cabinet noticed. The Japanese government also experienced some difficulties in its relationship with China, in which it had invested a considerable amount. The DPJ has come to understand with increasing clarity that others in the region have been watching closely the U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan could not afford the impression of a rift to “gain traction.” It turns out that all politics is not 100 percent local, as it had been seen in Japan for some months before then. The decision came against a series of other policy decisions by the Japanese government that demonstrate that the alliance is about more than basing issues. Japan has allocated $900 million in its current budget towards a multi-year, $5 billion, pledge to the Afghan Army and police, including for rehabilitation and training of demobilized Taliban and important development projects. Japan, like the United States, believes that peace and security in Afghanistan depend significantly on stability in Pakistan, and Tokyo has pledged $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan and hosted a major pledging conference. Japan has strongly backed the Republic of Korea, in the face of aggression from the North, in the wake of the Cheonan incident. Its solidarity with South Korea has been firm and public. Japan has sought trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea, and taken a leading role in fashioning a UN Security Council response. As a member of the UN Security Council, this year, Japan is supporting the U.S.–led draft of a resolution on Iran. Prime Minister Kan – Prime Minister to be Kan – indeed reiterated that support in his first conversation with President Obama, this past week. Japan’s leadership has made clear recently that it favors U.S. participation in an eventual East Asian Community, a change taken from the DPJ position last fall. Japan strongly supported President Obama’s initiatives in the April Nuclear Security Summit and worked closely with the U.S. delegation at the NPT Review Conference in May. So, nine months after the DPJ’s electoral victory, the scorecard, from the U.S. perspective, at last, is positive and improving. There has been lots of attention to what a rough ride it has been, to the precipitous decline in Hatoyama’s polling numbers and, ultimately, his demise, his political demise, to the difficulties of the DPJ government in “getting its feet under it.” And now the – as I said – the resignation. I’ll leave to experts on Japan the analysis of these, but from the viewpoint of the U.S., the larger issue, in conclusion, is this: That Japan has gone through the single most dramatic political change in 50 years – after 50 years of stasis in party rule, and the U.S.-Japan alliance has emerged in sound condition, having been scrutinized and ultimately validated by the new political leadership. This is, in one sense, not surprising, since 80 percent of all Japanese, in polling, support the alliance. That is the indispensible foundation for the alliance.
3. Plan Incentives Anti-Alliance Activity – Ensuring Total Withdrawal
Col. Dan Melton, a former marine attache at U.S. Embassy Tokyo, currently serves as the assistant chief of staff, G-5, U.S. Marine Corps Bases, Japan. Robert Eldridge, Ph.D., a former tenured associate professor of U.S.-Japan relations and Okinawan history at Osaka University, 10 [U.S. marine presence in Okinawa Pref. essential, www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/20100304dy01.htm]
The implied argument in the op-ed--that the forfeiting of MCAS Futenma and removal of all Marines from Okinawa would "preserve local support for Kadena"--is misplaced. Regrettably, the fact is anti-base, anti-alliance activists will only pocket concessions and continue to press for the next one. Following the closure of MCAS Futenma without a replacement, as recommended by Mr. O'Hanlon, the activists will likely turn their attention next to closing Kadena Air Base, which would further degrade alliance capabilities.
E Asian stability
1. War inevitable
Their Armitage et al says that multiple alt causes – Korea, Taiwan, India/Pakistan, and Indonesia – could all lead to nuclear war which US action would be incapable of averting
Lee doesn’t say anything about the alliance solving china war – it claims that we are heading towards an inevitable war, not just inevitable aggression
2. Futenma is Necessary For Asian Stability – Futenma withdrawal uniquely Signals Weakness to every Asian Alliance
David Axe, Military Correspondent @ The Diplomat, 6/28/10 [Why Allies Need US Base, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/28/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/]
So, will the Futenma dispute also prove the undoing of Hatoyama’s successor, Naoto Kan, who has so far stayed quiet on the base issue? If anything, the crisis over Futenma underscored the lasting, even growing, importance of US military facilities in Okinawa—not only for the United States, but also for Japan and other US allies. As China’s economic and military rise continues and tensions mount over North Korea’s nuclear programme and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship, the US and its Asian allies need Okinawa more than ever.‘The US, South Korea and Australia have been very vocal to Japan, saying, “Hey, be careful what you’re doing,”’ Sheila Smith, an analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations, says. ‘This isn’t a good moment to be taking large numbers of US forces out of Japan.’ Aside from US forces in South Korea (which are exclusively focused on the North Korean land threat) there are just two significant concentrations of US troops in East Asia: in Okinawa and on the Pacific island Guam of. Okinawa lies just an hour’s flight time from both the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan; Guam, by contrast, is 1000 miles from any potential theatre of war. ‘It may be easier for us to be there [in Guam], as far as the diplomatic issue is concerned,’ says Air Force spokesman John Monroe. ‘But if we’re in Guam, we’re out of the fight’ due to the distance. For combat forces to be capable of reacting quickly to the most likely crises, Okinawa is the only realistic option. Without its 2 Okinawan air bases and their 3 roughly 10,000-foot runways, the US military—and by extension, US allies—would depend almost entirely on a handful of US aircraft carriers for bringing to bear aerial firepower in East Asia. That might be a realistic option, except that China has lately deployed several new classes of anti-ship weaponry specifically meant for sinking US carriers, including the widely-feared DF-21 ballistic missile and a flotilla of stealthy fast-attack vessels. In recognition of Okinawa’s growing importance, the Pentagon has spent billions of dollars in the past decade modernizing forces and facilities on the island. The US Army deployed Patriot air-defence missiles capable of shooting down enemy aircraft as well as ballistic missiles, a favourite weapon of both China and North Korea. Kadena got extensive new storage bunkers for bombs, missiles and spare parts, allowing the base to support potentially hundreds of aircraft flown in from the United States during an emergency. In 2007, the US Air Force began stationing Global Hawk long-range spy drones and F-22 Raptor stealth fighters at Kadena. The Raptors represent perhaps the greatest improvement. Indeed, in the minds of US planners, in many ways Okinawa’s most important function is to support the F-22s. In a 2009 study examining a simulated air war pitting the United States and Taiwan against China, the California-based think-tank RAND concluded that a wing of F-22s could shoot down 27 Chinese fighters for every Raptor lost in the air. F-22s flying from Okinawa could also clear the way for air strikes on ground targets in China or North Korea, according to Lieutenant Colonel Wade Tolliver, commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron, an F-22 unit based in Virginia that routinely sends Raptors to Kadena. ‘There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defence systems,’ Tolliver says. ‘What we need to do is take some of our assets that have special capabilities…and we need to roll back those integrated air defence systems so we can bring in our joint forces.’ The base’s ability to host F-22s and follow-on aircraft is ‘probably the most important thing about Kadena,’ Monroe says. ‘Because of our capability to stage forces out of here—this is a huge runway—we do believe we have unmatched air power.’ All this planning for air wars with China and North Korea doesn’t mean that planners in the United States, Japan or anywhere else believe such conflict is inevitable. Pyongyang remains predictable only in its volatility, but Washington, Tokyo and Beijing are all working hard to forge peaceful and lasting ties. The strategic uncertainty is in the margins. ‘There’s no question you want to engage China, but (we should) hedge against an uncertain future,’ Nicholas Szechenyi of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says. It’s as a hedge that Okinawa remains indispensable to the US and its allies—so much so that the shared international need for the island’s bases must trump any Japanese domestic political calculations. Hatoyama ignored that truth at the expense of his job. The question now is will Kan?
3. US Balancing Effectively Balancing China Now
Lachlan Carmichael, @ 8/1 AFP [8/1/10, " Obama reviving US clout in Asia as China stumbles ", http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTM0Nzg1NjkzNQ==]
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi later warned the United States not to internationalize the issue, saying direct bilateral talks were the path to take. What Clinton did was burnish US credentials as a counterweight to China. The United States is "getting back into the game of balancing China in the eyes of many of the states in the region who feel they can't stand up to China alone and they need someone to pull them together collectively," Paal said. China, he said, has also bolstered Washington's own alliance with South Korea and Japan by failing to take a stronger stand on the sinking in March of a South Korean warship by what Seoul says was a North Korean torpedo. Bonnie Glaser, a China expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies who has been a consultant for the State and Defense Departments, said Asian nations have cooled toward China and warmed to the United States. "Most of the states in the region really welcomed China's rise," she said, citing new trade and investment opportunities there. "But increasingly countries think that China has been given a little bit too much running room, that there does need to be more balance and that the best power to do that is the United States," Glaser told AFP. "I think the Chinese really got out in front of us in the last decade and the US is really now sort of catching up," she added. – AFP
1. Their evidence takes out their own advantage – there’s unilateral Action Now – Their Harris Evidence Says US action Gets Others to Follow –THEIR Calder Ev. Says Obama is Already Supporting Efficiency and Reduction of GHG – The SQUO IS SUFFICIENT
2. Their Patel 07 evidence says in the ununderlined portion that the US and Japan are cooperating to solve warming right now – proves Futenma’s not a key internal link and status quo solves
3. Broad Co-operation on Climate Change Now DESPITE Futenma
Jeffrey Bader, Senior fellow at Brookings- Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, 6/7/10 [Keynote Speech: US-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized Partnership” http://stimson.org/japan/pdf/Transcript_Jeff_Bader.pdf]
Question: Yukie Yoshikawa, the Reischauer Center. Given the fact that the Futenma issue has been pretty much overdone and the fact that China and North Korea have been proving that East Asia has not been that stable yet, and I think it’s pretty much crucial for the United States to send a message not only to Japan but to East Asia in general that the relations with Japan are still important. And, in order to overcome the Futenma issue, I would presume that either the U.S. or the Japan side would propose a new agenda to prove that – to show some more solidarity or a stronger relationship. And I’m wondering what kind of agenda you would like to propose to Japan and to President Obama. Thank you. Bader: Well, the agenda that we have been talking about with the Japanese leadership, and the agenda that we see going forward includes cooperation on major international security issues, and I would highlight, among those three, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea, in no particular order. That is at the top of our foreign policy agenda. And, our cooperation with Japan on these three has been, I would say, has been good and getting better. I would say another issue would be a combination of climate change and clean energy issues. Japan is a global leader, if not the global leader, on clean energy, and a leader on climate change issues. This is an issue that didn’t end with Copenhagen. There are ways in which we can work together, both on the international regime and also, specifically, on Northeast Asia energy issues.
4. Adaptation solves the impact – empirically proven
Michaels 07 (Patrick, Senior Fellow in Environmental Studies @ Cato and Prof. Environmental Sciences @ UVA, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, “Global Warming: No Urgent Danger; No Quick Fix”, 8-21, http://cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8651)
We certainly adapted to 0.8 C temperature change quite well in the 20th century, as life expectancy doubled and some crop yields quintupled. And who knows what new and miraculously efficient power sources will develop in the next hundred years. The stories about the ocean rising 20 feet as massive amounts of ice slide off of Greenland by 2100 are also fiction. For the entire half century from 1915 through 1965, Greenland was significantly warmer than it has been for the last decade. There was no disaster. More important, there's a large body of evidence that for much of the period from 3,000 to 9,000 years ago, at least the Eurasian Arctic was 2.5 C to 7 C warmer than now in the summer, when ice melts. Greenland's ice didn't disappear then, either. Then there is the topic of interest this time of year — hurricanes. Will hurricanes become stronger or more frequent because of warming? My own work suggests that late in the 21st century there might be an increase in strong storms, but that it will be very hard to detect because of year-to-year variability. Right now, after accounting for increasing coastal population and property values, there is no increase in damages caused by these killers. The biggest of them all was the Great Miami Hurricane of 1926. If it occurred today, it would easily cause twice as much damage as 2005's vaunted Hurricane Katrina. So let's get real and give the politically incorrect answers to global warming's inconvenient questions. Global warming is real, but it does not portend immediate disaster, and there's currently no suite of technologies that can do much about it. The obvious solution is to forgo costs today on ineffective attempts to stop it, and to save our money for investment in future technologies and inevitable adaptation.
5. We outweigh on timeframe – the part of their Lynas card they shrunk down to 6 point font says that it will take a century for us to reach any crisis level
1. Kan Winning EXTERNAL Issues Now– The Tax Question ITSELF Is The Problem
Jiff Kingston, Director of Asian studies at Temple University, 7/9/10 [Can Anyone Govern Japan?, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/07/09/can_anyone_govern_japan]
Even if they are sympathetic to Kan's agenda (and many are), voters have found it hard to ignore his party's short record in power so far -- which is abysmal. Since Hatoyama swept the LDP from power in September 2009, campaign-financing scandals have dogged leading DPJ figures, the U.S. alliance has frayed, and the party has yet to show any policy successes. There was a brief window after Hatoyama resigned in June for Kan to make a fresh start. He was the new face of the party, a social activist from a middle-class family who joked to reporters that he is a good debater thanks to constant bickering with his wife. He is known as Ira Ira Kan, a reference to his fiery temper, and unlike Hatoyama, he is a leader with a record of passion and toughness. And the initial signs were promising: He extended the olive branch to Washington over Okinawa and to the business community in Japan, trying to convince both that they can rely on the DPJ despite its previous stumbles. That's where the good news ends, however. The tax gaffe sent his approval rating plummeting, deep-sixing any hopes that he would rise above the politics of the past.
2. No link to economic collapse – their Rafferty says that the government will face a burden, it doesn’t hint at a collapse big enough to trigger their impacts and their Reuters is unqualified and doesn’t even hint at economic collapse
3. No internal link to global collapse – their Amadeo only says that Japanese collapse could slow US economic growth
4. Two Decades of Japan Depression Disprove Their Claims
Thomas R. Eddlem, 8/5/10, “Is America Headed toward a Japanese-Style Economic “Lost Decades”,
The Japanese economy has experienced minimal economic growth since the 1980s, despite regular “stimulus” by increased government spending and borrowing. Once a manufacturing giant, the service sector of the Japanese economy now makes up three-quarters of its economy, and much of Japan's manufacturing base has been "outsourced" to Korea, China and elsewhere in East Asia. “The terrible trap of deflation gripped Japan for nearly fifteen years after its financial collapse in 1989,” Bullard noted. “Japan's economy struggled to restart, but repeatedly fell back into recession. That is one definition of Depression — an economy that cannot get out of the ditch.” How bad is it? Per capita Japanese income has shrunk compared with U.S. per capita income by nearly half since 1995. Imagine losing nearly half of your current purchasing power. Bullard claimed in his research paper that “it is conceivable to think that deflation could hurt the financial system and hamper US growth,” noting that Japan has suffered two full decades of recession that happened to coincide with some slight consumer price deflation over the same time period.
5. No impact – Green and Schrage aren’t predictive at all and they’re empirically denied by the recent economic crisis
6. Japan’s economy is stable – empirically proven that the consumption tax will crush growth.
(Andy Hoffman, Barrie McKenna, Globe and Mail, 7/12/10, " Setback at polls casts doubt on Japan's economic reforms ", http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/setback-at-polls-casts-doubt-on-japans-economic-reforms/article1636586/)
Despite its debt issues and troubling inflation, Japan's economy has performed well lately, with GDP increasing 4.6 per cent in the first quarter, the second-fastest among the Group of Eight countries behind Canada. As well, Japan's debt troubles are less problematic than many countries because the vast majority of government debt is held by domestic investors. The election losses will make it more difficult for Mr. Kan to push fiscal austerity. But Drummond Brodeur, vice-president and portfolio manager at Signature Global Advisors in Toronto, noted that it was always going to be a hard sell for Mr. Kan because there's no sense of urgency among the Japanese to put the country's fiscal house in order. “;Japan has been in a deflationary, stagnant economy for two decades now. So there's no sense of crisis,” he said. Nor is there a sense of crisis in financial markets: Interest rates are near zero and the yen is near its all-time high versus the U.S. dollar. Mr. Brodeur also pointed out that Mr. Kan was facing dissent within his party on the consumption-tax hike, even before the Upper House election. There's a legitimate concern that raising the consumption tax could hurt Japan's fragile consumer economy, just as it did in the mid-1990s, the last time the rate was hiked, he said.
Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM